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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950425-CA 
v. : 
CATRINA MARIE OTTESEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JVRIgPICTIQN AND NATTJEE QF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug free 
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1995), in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd 
C. Park, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly conclude that defendant was 
reasonably detained in a traffic stop. *[T]he trial court's 
final determination concerning lawfulness of a detention or 
search is reviewed for correctness. State v. White. 856 P.2d 
656, 659 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court's ruling should not, 
however, be subjected to ua close de novo review." State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). Rather, some deference is 
accorded the trial court because the reasonable suspicion 
standard itself "conveys a measure of discretion to the trial 
judge[s]" so that they can "grapple with the multitude of fact 
patterns that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion 
determination." J&. at 939-40. In contrast, the trial court's 
findings of purely factual issues that underlie its reasonable 
suspicion determination, such as witness credibility and 
historical facts, are subject to reversal only if clearly 
erroneous. Id. at 93 9 n.4. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE? 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
pertinent to this issues on appeal are fully set out Addendum A: 
Amendment 4, United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 32a-12-209 (1994); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-4-44.4 (1993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Catrina Marie Ottesen, was charged with 
possession of marijuana, a controlled substance, with intent to 
distribute in a drug free zone (Count I), illegal drug tax, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-
103(1) (b) (1992) (Count II), unlawful possession or use of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-37a-5(l) (1994) (Count III), and 
illegal possession of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 32a-12-209 (1994) (Count IV) (R. 
16-17). Defendant entered into a conditional plea, preserving 
the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress 
evidence, and pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute in a drug free zone in a drug 
free zone (R. 93-94) . The other counts were dismissed (R. 93) . 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a suspended term of one-
to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, placing defendant on 
probation for thirty-six months upon certain terms and conditions 
(R. 95-96) . 
2 
STATEMENT QF TCT FACT? 
On January 6, 1994, Orem City Police Officer Gary McGiven 
was patrolling in an unmarked car when a rapidly traveling car 
pulled to within a car length behind him and continued following 
at this distance for a couple of blocks (R. 129-30) . After 
allowing the car to pass, Officer Mcgiven pulled behind the car 
and turned on his red and blue visor lights in order to stop it 
for traveling at an unsafe distance (R, 46-47, 130-31). 
The car pulled over and the driver and passenger/owner-of-
the-car, identified themselves to the officer as Dameon 
Littlefield and Catrina Ottesen, respectively (R. 29 n.2, 131-
32). While asking for the driver's identification, Officer 
McGiven smelled alcohol on Littlefield's breath (R. 132). 
Discovering also that Littlefield was under twenty-one years of 
age, the officer ran a license and warrants check on Littlefield 
and found that there was an outstanding warrant for a speeding 
violation (R. 133). Officer McGiven advised Littlefield of the 
outstanding warrant and asked him to get out of the car (R. 133) . 
When Littlefield exited, the officer smelled the alcohol more 
strongly and noticed that Littlefield's eyes appeared to be 
glazed, his pupils constricted and his speech "slow and thick" 
(R. 133, 140). At this point Officer McGiven called for backup 
from the Alcohol Enforcement Officer, Wayne Fish (R. 133, 140). 
Approximately fifteen minutes had passed since the initial stop 
(R. 140). 
Officer Fish, who was only eight blocks away, appeared on 
the scene in about five or ten minutes (R. 134, 161). He also 
smelled alcohol on Littlefield and conducted a field sobriety 
test. The horizontal gaze nystagmus test, plus the odor of 
3 
alcohol indicated the presence of alcohol, later confirmed by 
blood alcohol tests (R. 168-70). 
Either while Officer Fish was conducting the field sobriety 
tests or just after, Officer McGiven turned his attention to 
defendant (R. 156, 159). Her physical appearance and 
identification indicated that she also was under age (R. 142-43) . 
Suspecting the presence of alcohol, the officer asked her if 
there was any alcohol in the car (R. 141, 144). In response, 
defendant reached down to the floorboard, retrieved five unopened 
bottles of beer and handed them to Officer McGiven (R. 144-45) • 
Following some discussion about how the situation should be 
handled (R. 145), Officer McGiven, knowing that he could 
legitimately search the car incident to Littlefield's arrest on 
either the outstanding warrant or for a probable violation of the 
"not a drop" law1 (R. 147-48), approached defendant with her 
various options, to wit: defendant could consent to a search of 
the car, in which case the officer would issue her a citation for 
a minor in possession of alcohol, or he would arrest her and 
search the car without her consent (R. 148-49).2 
Defendant refused to consent to a search (R. 149). She was 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.4 (1993) provides: nA person 
younger than 21 years of age may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle with any measurable blood, breath, 
or urine alcohol concentration in his body as shown by a chemical 
test." 
2
 While the options presented to defendant appear to have 
the tone of an ultimatum, the circumstances tend to confirm 
Officer McGiven's view that, "No, I didn't put it like that at 
all" (R. 149). As noted, Officer McGiven knew that he could 
search the car regardless of defendant's consent (R. 147). In 
asking for defendant's consent without arresting her, when he 
intended to search the car anyway, he explained that he was just 
being a "nice guy" (R. 147). 
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then arrested for being a minor in possession of alcohol (R. 
150). Incident to that arrest, the officers first searched 
defendant's coat and found rolling papers in the pocket (R. 163). 
Thereafter, they found in the car baggies of marijuana and a 
large amount of marijuana in a gym bag (R. 163-65). 
S9MMAEY QF AROTMgNT 
POINT I 
Defendant's multiple attacks on the reasonableness of her 
initial detention and its expanded scope fail for lack of factual 
and legal support. Defendant, a minor and owner and passenger in 
her car, does not challenge the initial stop of the car for 
following an unmarked patrol car at an unsafe distance. The 
developing events thereafter justified her continued detention 
for investigation and consequent arrest for being a minor in 
possession of alcohol, and for the search of the car, which 
uncovered controlled substances resulting in defendant's arrest 
for drug related offenses. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the record supports the 
trial court's findings that the driver of the car did not have a 
valid driver's license and that the driver, a minor, showed signs 
of intoxication. Even if these findings were clearly erroneous, 
it would not effect the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
defendant was justifiably detained. The car was legitimately 
stopped for a moving violation during which time the officer 
properly checked the driver's license and simultaneously checked 
for warrants. Not only did the driver have an outstanding 
warrant, but his breath also smelled of alcohol, giving the 
officer probable cause to arrest him for violating the "not a 
drop" law. 
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Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly stated that a police 
officer may conduct a warrants check in the course of a routine 
traffic stop, as long as the added detention is not unduly 
prolonged. Further, there is no bright-line rule on the time 
period within which an investigative detention must be performed, 
as long as the police officer diligently pursues the 
investigation to either confirm or dispel his suspicions. In 
this case the record indicates that the license and warrants 
checks were conducted simultaneously and that defendant was 
detained only fifteen minutes before the officer, alone with two 
suspects, requested backup to investigate the driver's apparent 
intoxication. Further, because the officer was justified in 
stopping the car and extending the detention to investigate the 
driver, defendant's extended detention was justified. Finally, 
defendant was justifiably detained in her own right because the 
investigating officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that she, the owner of the car, was a minor in possession of 
alcohol based on her companion's evidently having recently 
consumed alcohol. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIABLY DETAINED AND HER 
CAR WAS JUSTIFIABLY SEARCHED INCIDENT TO BOTH 
HER AND THE DRIVER'S ARRESTS 
Defendant argues, in substance, that following the traffic 
stop, she was unjustifiably detained while Officer McGiven did a 
license and warrants check on Littlefield, the driver, and 
thereafter for fifteen minutes, an unreasonable period of time, 
while Officer McGiven requested backup to assess Littlefield's 
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supposed intoxication. Appellant's Br. at 7. She further argues 
that because Officer McGiven smelled neither marijuana or alcohol 
on her, nor had any indication that defendant had violated the 
law, there was no reasonable justification to detain her at all, 
much less ask her about the presence of alcohol in the car. 
Appellant's Br. at 7, 10. 
Defendant does not dispute that the initial stop of the car 
for following at an unsafe distance was justified. See State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132, (Utah 1994) (a police officer may 
legally stop a vehicle for a traffic violation). The State does 
not dispute, for the purposes of this appeal, that defendant was 
detained when the car was initially stopped,3 but argues that the 
scope of her detention was justified by the circumstances that 
rendered the initial stop permissible in the first place. See 
State v. Hiaains, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (stating that 
an automobile passenger's seizure "arguably continued during the 
trip back to the [scene of the theft] but was not unreasonable 
because the officers were entirely justified in stopping the 
car"). In fact, the record confirms that the officers had 
reasonable justification at every stage of the stop to further 
detain defendant and her companion while investigating offenses 
related to motor vehicles and alcoholic beverages. 
3
 The motion to suppress hearing was conducted with the 
apparent understanding that defendant was seized when the car was 
stopped. This assumption, however, is not compelled. In State 
v. Hiaains, the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped 
because the driver had left a gasoline station without paying. 
State v. Hiaains, 884 P.2d 1242, 1243 (Utah 1994). The court 
assumed, but refused to hold, that the automobile passenger was 
seized by the initial stop of the car. Id. at 1244. 
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A. Tfce fcfrw conceding Scops Qf Pet$frtiQii 
"'What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and 
seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (1968) (quoting Elkins 
v. United States. 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1446-47 
(1960) ) . "To determine whether a search or seizure is 
constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual inquiry: (1) Was the 
police officer's action "justified at its inception'? And (2) Was 
the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place'?" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Terry at 19-20, 88 S. 
Ct. at 1879). 
In Lopez, the court set out in full the considerations used 
to determine whether the scope of the police officer's 
investigation lay within constitutional limitations: 
Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 
"must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop." Florid vT Rcyer, 460 u.s. 491, 500, 
103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983). Both the 
"length and [the] scope of the detention must 
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible." State vT JohnSQri/ 805 P. 2d 
761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. 
at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878). . . . 
Investigative questioning that further 
detains the driver must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity. Reasonable suspicion means 
suspicion based oh specific, articulable 
facts drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officer at the time 
of the stop. £££ State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 
181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v, Mynsen, 821 
P.2d 13, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); TState v.1 
Robinson. 797 P.2d [431], 435 [(Utah App. 
1990)]. If reasonable suspicion of more 
serious criminal activity does arise, the 
scope of the stop is still limited. The 
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officers must "'diligently [pursue] a means 
of investigation that [is] likely to confirm 
or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it [is] necessary to detain the 
defendant.1" State Vt grpvier, 808 P.2d 133, 
136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting United 
States V, Sharps, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 84 L. 
Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985)). 
Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132. 
u[T]he trial court's final determination concerning 
lawfulness of a detention or search is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah App. 1993). The trial 
court's ruling should not, however, be subjected to "a close de 
novo review." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
Rather, some deference is accorded the trial court because the 
reasonable suspicion standard itself "conveys a measure of 
discretion to the trial judge [s]" so that they can "grapple with 
the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a reasonable-
suspicion determination." Id. at 939-40. 
B. The Trial Court's Findings Concerning Continued 
Detention Based on an Investigation of the Status 
<?Z the Driver's Licemge »*id Level pf intpxig^tipn 
were not Clearly Erroneous 
Defendant's first challenge to the scope of her detention is 
couched as a challenge to the trial court's findings. She claims 
that the trial court's assumption that Littlefield, the driver of 
the car, did not have a valid driver's license and that Officer 
McGiven's observation that Littlefield showed "signs of 
intoxication" (R. 61), are unsupported by the record and, 
therefore, inadequate to justify her continued detention. 
Appellant's Br. at 5-6. Defendant substantially misreads the 
record. 
In contrast to the constricted deference given to the trial 
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court's legal conclusions, its findings of purely factual issues 
that underlie its reasonable suspicion determination, such as 
witness credibility and historical facts, are subject to reversal 
only if clearly erroneous, Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 n.4. Factual 
determinations are clearly erroneous only if they conflict with 
the clear weight of the evidence or if the reviewing court has a 
definite and firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been 
made. State v. Hargraves. 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991) . 
All disputes in the evidence are resolved in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination. Pena. 869 P.2d at 
936 (noting that the clearly erroneous standard is highly 
deferential to the trial court, not only because the trial judge 
in the best position to assess witness credibility, but also 
because the judge is "in the best position . . . to derive a 
sense of the proceedings as a whole, something an appellate court 
cannot hope to garner from a cold record"). 
The Validity of the Driver's License 
Officer McGiven testified that he asked Littlefield for 
identification, that in response Littlefield gave his name and 
date of birth, that he (the officer) ran a check on Littlefield's 
license and that he was not sure whether the license was 
suspended (R. 133). On cross-examination Officer McGiven 
reiterated that he was not sure whether the license was valid, 
but added, with respect to having checked the license even though 
he apparently did not charge Littlefield with an offense related 
to the license: "That particular charge was not one of my major 
concerns at the time" (R. 137-38). Additionally, the State 
argued to the trial court (see Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, 
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hereinafter "State's memorandum," R. 38-47), that Littlefield 
told Officer McGiven that he did not have his license with him 
(R. 43). 
The trial court made two separate findings regarding 
Littlefield's license. First, the court found that "Littlefield 
told Sergeant McGiven that he did not have his driver's license 
with him, so the officer ran a check on Littlefield for his 
driver's license and for outstanding warrants" (Memorandum 
Decision, hereinafter "Decision," R. 56-59, at 58, par. 3, 
attached at Addendum B). Second, the court found that 
"Littlefield did not have a driver's license" (Decision, R. 57, 
par. 9). In making its findings the trial court generally relied 
on the parties' memoranda.4 At the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, defendant did not challenge the State's assertion in 
the State's memorandum that Littlefield had told Officer McGiven 
that he did not have a license. Thus, it is fair to assume that 
the assertion was accurate. Even considering just the motion to 
suppress hearing, a fair reading of the record is that the 
license was invalid because Officer McGiven appears to have 
discovered a licensing violation, but that he was not very 
concerned about it, considering that Littlefield had an 
outstanding warrant and was evidently in violation of the "not a 
drop" law. On these facts, the court's finding cannot be said to 
be clearly erroneous. 
Even if the finding was erroneous, i.e., Littlefield was 
4
 One explicit instance of the court's reliance on the 
parties' memoranda is its reference to defendant's memorandum in 
support of defendant's motion to suppress (See Decision, R. 58, 
par. 6). 
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found to possess a valid license, the ultimate status of the 
license was irrelevant to the officer's detaining Littlefield to 
determine the status of the license following a legitimate 
traffic stop and to simultaneously run a warrants check, as 
argued below. Once the outstanding warrant was discovered, the 
ensuing arrest justified a search the of the car. 
Littlefield'8 Showing ""Signs of Intoxication" 
Officer McGiven testified that he smelled a slight odor of 
alcohol on Littlefield's breath as he questioned him about his 
identity (R. 132). The smell was much stronger when Littlefield 
exited the car and got closer to the officer (R. 133). Defendant 
neglects to mention that Officer McGiven then noticed "some other 
symptoms that [the officer] was concerned about as well," to wit: 
Littlefield's eyes appeared to be glazed, his pupils appeared to 
be constricted and his speech was slow and thick. These symptoms 
were significant enough in Officer McGiven's mind to summon Wayne 
Fish, an Alcohol Enforcement Officer, to the scene (R. 133, 140). 
Officer Fish confirmed Officer McGiven's observation that 
Littlefield's pupils were constricted. Littlefield's horizontal 
gaze nystagmus test also indicated the presence of alcohol in 
Littlefield's blood (R. 168), the alcohol level of which later 
tested at 0.035 percent (R. 170). 
In support of its finding that Officer McGiven observed 
"signs of intoxication," the trial court also found that "[w]hile 
talking with defendant Littlefield,5 Sergeant McGiven observed 
that Littlefield's eyes were glazed, his pupils appeared 
5
 Both defendant and Littlefield were arrested for 
substantially similar offenses and both moved to suppress in the 
same proceeding (Decision, R. 58-59). 
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abnormally constricted, and his speech was slow and thick" 
(Decision, R. 58, par. 3). Based on the record, these findings 
cannot be considered clearly erroneous, However, even if the 
challenged finding was erroneous, it would not prejudice 
defendant. The signs Officer McGiven observed plainly justified 
further detention to determine Littlefield's level of 
intoxication for public safety reasons, as the trial court noted 
(Decision, R. 57, par. 9). Further, considering that Officer 
McGiven had determined at the outset that Littlefield was under 
age, the mere smelling of alcohol on Littlefield's breath was 
ground for arresting him on the "not a drop" law, justifying a 
search incident to arrest on that ground. Finally, as discussed 
below, the smell of alcohol on Littlefield's breath gave probable 
cause to believe that there was alcohol in the car, an 
independent basis for arresting defendant for being a minor in 
possession of alcohol. 
C. Defendant was not Unreasonably Detained by a 
The trial court found that: 
8. . . . Utah case law allow officers to run 
a warrants check in connection with a traffic 
stop "so long as it does not significantly 
extend the period of detention beyond that 
reasonably necessary to request a driver's 
license and valid registration and to issue a 
citation. . . . 
9. In the present case, Sergeant McGiven 
testified that he observed signs of 
intoxication in defendant Littlefield and 
that Littlefield did not have a driver's 
license. Each of these circumstances provide 
justification for he warrants check run by 
Sergeant McGiven, and the question of whether 
Littlefield was driving under the influence 
of alcohol or a controlled substance would 
necessitate extending the duration of the 
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traffic stop for purposes of ensuring public 
safety. For these reasons, the Court finds 
that Sergeant McGiven's actions in running a 
warrants check on defendant Littlefield were 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
(Decision, R. 57). 
Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling that Officer 
McGiven properly detained her while he checked for warrants on 
Littlefield, relying primarily on State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 
(Utah 1991). In that case the defendant passenger and her 
companion were stopped in a car having no registration and which 
neither the driver nor passenger evidently owned. Id. at 762. 
Asking only for the occupants' identification, the officer 
immediately ran a warrant's check to determine whether the car 
was stolen, discovering the passenger had outstanding warrants 
Id. A search of the passenger's backpack incident to her arrest 
produced drug paraphernalia and amphetamines. Id. The supreme 
court reversed defendant's conviction, holding that the paucity 
of facts available to the officer did not give rise to an 
articulable suspicion of criminality justifying expanding the 
scope of the detention to include a warrants check. Id. at 764. 
This case is dramatically different than Johnson. First, 
the detention to check for warrants against the defendant in 
Johnson was unjustified because the officer had not yet asked 
questions that might readily have abated his suspicions about 
whether the car was stolen. Id. In this case, however, Officer 
McGiven did not even run a warrants check against defendant. 
Second, the warrants check against Littlefield was justified, not 
only by his not having a license, but also because he was plainly 
in violation of the "not a drop" law. 
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Since Johnson. Utah's appellate courts have explicitly 
stated that conducting a warrants check in connection with a 
routine traffic stop is justified so long as it does not 
significantly extend the period of detention. State v. Robinson, 
797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990); State Y, FiguerQfr-SQlfrrJQ, 
830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 
866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) State v. Rochel. 850 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah App. 1993); Hiaains. 884 P.2d at 1245 n.2. 
Distinguishing Johnson, the court in Lopez explained the 
policy considerations justifying checking for warrants following 
a routine traffic stop: "On one hand, the impact of a warrants 
check on the scope of detention is minimal because 'computerized 
data storage renders the time for a check negligible.' . . . On 
the other hand, the governmental interest in arresting citizens 
who have outstanding warrants is substantial. Lopez. 873 P.2d at 
1133 (citations omitted). Therefore, if the officer can complete 
the warrants check within the period of time necessary to 
complete his duties incurred by the stop, then the "stop is 
lawful because the check does 'not add to the delay already 
lawfully experienced by the offender as a result of his 
violation' and does 'not represent any further intrusion on his 
rights.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
There is no allegation that the warrants check unduly 
prolonged defendant's detention while Officer McGiven checked 
Littlefield's license, but rather that the detention simply 
occurred. Appellant's Br. at 7. See Hiaains. 884 P.2d at 1245 
n.2 (rejecting challenge to a detention involving a warrants 
check, in part because there was no showing that the warrants 
check significantly extended the period of time reasonably 
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necessary to run the driver's license check). It would appear 
from the record that Officer McGiven requested the warrants and 
license check simultaneously and received the results very 
shortly thereafter (R. 133). On this record, defendant has 
failed to show that the trial court improperly concluded that the 
warrants check was justified. 
D. Defendant Fails to Show that She was Unreasonably 
Petfrinsd by a waiting tor Police Backup 
Defendant also argues that she was unduly detained for 
fifteen minutes while waiting for Officer Fish to respond to 
Officer McGiven7s request for backup. Appellant's Br. at 7. 
However, defendant cites no authority nor genuinely argues that 
such period is constitutionally impermissible, and the Court 
-should therefore decline to consider the argument. State v. 
Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.) (refusing to consider 
arguments unsupported by legal analysis or authority, citing 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)), cert, denied. 
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) . In any case, the claim fails to 
recognize the real considerations in assessing a constitutionally 
acceptable period of detention. 
In State v. Grovier. this Court stated: 
The United States Supreme Court has not 
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the 
acceptable length of a detention because 
"common sense and ordinary human experience 
must govern over rigid criteria." United 
States v. Sharpe.. 47Q U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. 
Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). The 
Court has chosen to focus, not on the length 
of the detention alone, but on "whether the 
police diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or 
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which 
time it was necessary to detain the 
defendant." Id. at 686, 105 S.Ct. at 1575. 
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Grovier. 808 P.2d at 136 (findina reasonable a ninety minute 
detention to first move a car to a safe place and then search it 
to verify a reliable informant's tip that the defendant was 
transporting narcotics) (citations omitted); Figueroa-SolflrJQ/ 
830 P.2d at 280 ("the length of a detention is not dispositive of 
its reasonableness"). 
After Officer McGiven stopped the car, checked Littlefield's 
license and for warrants and assessed again the signs of 
Littlefield's probable intoxication, the officer called for 
backup, all of which took about fifteen minutes (R. 133, 140). 
Officer Fish was eight blocks away when he received the call, and 
he responded immediately, arriving within five or ten minutes (R. 
134, 161). Defendant fails to show that the time period 
preceding Officer McGiven's request for backup or Officer Fish's 
response time were unacceptable in the circumstances, or that in 
requesting backup, Officer McGiven was not diligently pursuing a 
means of investigation calculated to confirm his suspicions about 
Littlefield's state of inebriation. In sum, the Court should 
find the trial court correctly concluded that the stop was 
reasonably extended for purposes of ensuring public safety 
(Decision, R. 57, par. 9). 
E. officer Mcgjveyi fr^a Rgagpufrfrie syigpicipfr tp Agk 
Defendant about the Presence of Alcohol in the Car 
Defendant finally argues that because Officer McGiven did 
not smell alcohol or marijuana on defendant, or have any reason 
to believe that defendant had violated the law or that there was 
contraband in the car, his asking defendant whether there was any 
alcohol in the car and the resulting search violated her Fourth 
Amendment rights. Appellant's Br. at 7-8, 10. In support, 
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defendant cites State v- qpflina-LWia/ 826 P. 2d 652 (Utah App. 
1992) and State v. Zeigleman. 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah App. 
1995) . Because defendant fails to adequately assess the facts 
available to Officer McGiven when he approached defendant, his 
argument is flawed and his authority inapposite.6 
The reasonable suspicion test for making an investigative 
stop is well-known: "where an officer observes unusual conduct 
which reasonably leads him to conclude in light of his experience 
that criminal activity may be afoot" a brief investigative stop 
and detention to dispel the officerfs suspicion or prevent 
criminal activity is justified. Terry. 392 U.S. at 22, 30, 88 S. 
Ct. at 1880, 1884-85 (emphasis added); State v. Beanr 869 P.2d 
984, 986 (Utah App. 1994) (uan officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime") (emphasis in 
original) .7 
6
 The trial court did not make an express finding on the 
reasonableness of Officer McGiven's question, probably because 
the argument was only cursorily mentioned in defendant's 
memorandum (R. 22) and not at all at the evidentiary hearing on 
the motion to suppress. Such nominal reference is ground for 
refusing to consider defendant's argument. State v. Dudley. 847 
P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1993) ("Mere allusion to state 
constitutional claims, unsupported by meaningful analysis, does 
not permit appellate review."). Even if the trial court 
considered defendant's claim, but failed to make express 
findings, the Court may assume that the lower court made the 
requisite findings since the underlying record facts are in 
accord with its decision. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1130 (finding 
the necessary findings implicit in the trial court's other 
findings and because consistent with its suppression order, 
citing State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6 (Utah 1991)). 
7
 The reasonable suspicion standard is also codified: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
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In evaluating the validity of an inver-.igative stop or 
detention, a court must consider fffthe totality of the 
circumstances -- the whole picture.1" United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (quoting United State 
v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). &££ alSQ State v» 
Stricklina. 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992). 
In Ziegleman. this Court recognized that an investigating 
officer's question about whether there were any weapons or 
narcotics in the car "exceeded the scope of detention for a 
routine traffic stop and bore no relation to the issue of whether 
the vehicle was stolen, and thus the continued detention violated 
the Fourth Amendment." Ziegleman, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. at 57 n.l. 
In Godina-Luna. this Court came to a similar conclusion where the 
officer asked the defendants about the presence of firearms or 
drugs after having satisfied himself that they were not driving 
under the influence of alcohol, the basis for the stop. Godina-
Luna,826 p.2d at 654-55. 
Both Zeigleman and Godina-Luna illustrate, by contrast, the 
valid basis for Officer McGiven's questioning defendant in this 
case. Officer McGiven suspected defendant was a minor even 
before he spoke to her on the basis of her physical appearance, 
and he confirmed that suspicion when he checked defendant's 
license (R. 143). Further, he suspected that there might be 
alcohol in the car after he first smelled it on Littlefield's 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995). 
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breath (R. 144). However, the officer only first questioned 
defendant during or after the field sobriety tests on 
Littlefield, when the driver's violation of the "not a drop" law, 
applicable to minors, became even more evident (R. 156, 159). 
Given Littlefield's obvious consumption of some alcohol, 
still evident on his breath, it was reasonable for the officer to 
believe that there might be alcohol in the car. Cf. State v. 
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972 (Utah App. 1992) (finding reasonable, 
as an exception to the warrant requirement, a vehicle search upon 
detecting the odor of marijuana). A minor violates Utah Code 
Ann. § 32a-12-209 (1994) merely by being in possession of 
alcohol, even if she has not consumed any. Therefore, Officer 
McGiven's failure to smell alcohol or marijuana about defendant's 
person does not bear on his reasonably suspecting her of 
violating that statute. Given that the car belonged to 
defendant,8 that she was a minor and that alcohol was probably in 
the car, Officer McGiven had a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that defendant had violated the law, justifying his asking a 
question that would either confirm or dispel his suspicions. 
Indeed, by asking whether there was alcohol in the car, Officer 
McGiven investigated his suspicions in precisely the way 
recommended by the supreme court in Johnson, to wit: he proceeded 
in the most minimally intrusive way to either confirm or dispel 
his suspicions. Johnson. 805 P.2d at 764. In sum, the officer's 
question to defendant was justified under the circumstances. 
8
 Defendant asserted in her motion to suppress that she was 
the owner of the car, a fact not disputed on appeal (See 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, R. 29 
n.2) . 
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In response to Officer McGiven's question, defendant 
produced five bottles of beer, thus establishing that she was a 
minor in possession of alcohol and subject to arrest (R. 145). 
On appeal defendant does not challenge that incident to a valid 
arrest the officers would have authority to search the car, 
relying on the strength of her preceding arguments. However, the 
search was plainly justified, being based not only on defendant's 
arrest, but also on Littlefield's arrest for violating the "not a 
drop" law and the outstanding warrant (R. 154). Therefore, 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the 
officers searched the car and found a large quantity of 
marijuana. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Based on this Court's prior development of the issues raised 
in this case, the State does not request oral argument. 
CONCISION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // day of March, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. 32a-12-209 (1994) 
(1) It is unlawful for any person under the 
age of 21 years to purchase, possess, or 
consume any alcoholic beverage or product, 
unless specifically authorized by this title. 
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.4 (1993) 
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of 
age may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle with any measurable 
blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration 
in his body as shown by a chemical test. 
Utah Code Ann. 77-7-15 (1995) 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
ADDENDUM B 
-- H " ^ Judica- District Court 
o I -dinCountv,Stateof Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD DAMON JJTTLEFIELD, 
CATRINA MARIE OTTENSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 941400179 
CASE NO. 941400180 
DATE January 9, 1995 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress, filed on July 6, 
1994, and a suppression hearing held September 26, 1994. At the suppression hearing, Utah 
County Attorney James R. Taylor appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. 
Defendant Richard Damon Littlefield was present with his attorney Shelden R. Carter, and 
defendant Catrina Maria Ottenson was present with her attorney Michael Esplin. Officers 
Gary McGiven and Wayne Fish were sworn and testified before the Court. Defendants were 
given ten days to submit supplemental memoranda to the Court and Mr. Taylor was given 
five days to respond. On October 7, 1994, the State filed a Request For Ruling based upon 
the briefs and arguments already presented, since neither defendant submitted supplemental 
memoranda during the ten days specified by the Court. 
The Court, having received and reviewed the motion, memorandum in support, 
memorandum in opposition, and the applicable law, and having heard testimony and oral 
arguments, now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. On January 6, 1994, defendants were arrested for (a) being minors in possession of 
alcohol; (b) for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; (c) for possession of drug 
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paraphernalia; and (d) for violating the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act. Defendant Littlefield 
was also arrested on an outstanding warrant for failure to appear on a traffic violation. 
2. The arrests were made subsequent to a traffic stop made by Sergeant McGiven of 
the Orem Department of Public Safety. Defendant Littlefield was driving defendant 
Ottenson's car, in which Ottenson was a passenger, when Sergeant McGiven stopped 
Littlefield for following the officer's vehicle too closely. 
3. While talking with defendant Littlefield, Sergeant McGiven observed that 
Littlefield's eyes were glazed, his pupils appeared abnormally constricted, and his speech 
was slow and thick. Littlefield told Sergeant McGiven that he did not have his driver's 
license with him, so the officer ran a check on Littlefield for his driver's license and for 
outstanding warrants. Upon being advised that there was an outstanding warrant on 
Littlefield for failure to appear on a traffic violation, Sergeant McGiven asked Littlefield to 
step out of the car. As Littlefield complied, Sergeant McGiven noticed the smell of alcohol. 
Because Sergeant McGiven was not on duty, he requested assistance from Officer Wayne 
Fish, who conducted sobriety tests on Defendant Littlefield. 
4. Defendant Ottenson surrendered a carton of beer to Sergeant McGiven. Sergeant 
McGiven placed Ottenson and Littlefield under arrest for being minors in possession of 
alcohol, and Sergeant McGiven conducted a search of the whole car incident to the arrests. 
5. During the search of the car, Sergeant McGiven found drug paraphernalia and 
marijuana, some of which appeared to be packaged for resale. Both defendants were then 
placed under arrest for possession of marijuana and intent to distribute within a drug-free 
zone. 
6. The Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Suppress alleges that 
defendants were arrested 18 minutes after the car was searched, and that the search was 
therefore not made incident to a lawful arrest. However, evidence presented indicates that 
both defendants were arrested on the charge of possession of alcohol by minors and that 
Memorandum Decision 941400179, 941400180 3£ 
000 
defendant Littlefield was arrested on the outstanding warrant, and that the search of the car 
was lawfully made incident to these arrests. The arrests for possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and violation of the Illegal Drug Tax 
Stamp Act were then made at the conclusion of the search of the car. 
8. Defendants also argue that the warrants check was unjustified and therefore 
improper. Defendants cite State v Johnson
 T 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), in support of their 
position. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that running a warrants check arguably 
exceeds the reasonable scope of the traffic stop when the officer has no reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity beyond the traffic offense itself. However, Utah case law allows officers 
to run a warrants check in connection with a traffic stop "so long as it does not significantly 
extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license 
and valid registration and to issue a citation." See State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994). See also State v. Figueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Chapman. 841 P.2d 725 (Utah App. 1992), cert, granted. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
9. In the present case, Sergeant McGiven testified that he observed signs of 
intoxication in defendant Littlefield and that Littlefield did not have a driver's license. Each 
of these circumstances provide justification for the warrants check run by Sergeant McGiven, 
and the question of whether Littlefield was driving under the influence of alcohol or a 
controlled substance would necessitate extending the duration of the traffic stop for purposes 
of ensuring public safety. For these reasons, the Court finds that Sergeant McGiven's 
actions in running a warrants check on defendant Littlefield were appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
10. Defendants also cite Utah case law holding it impermissible for police to use a 
misdemeanor arrest as an excuse to search for evidence of a more serious crime. See State 
v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds: State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Defendants argue that since penalties for the crime of 
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possession of alcohol by a minor are not affected by the quantity of alcohol involved, and 
since defendant Ottenson had voluntarily surrendered a carton of beer, Sergeant McGiven 
had no need to search the car in an attempt to find more alcohol. Defendants maintain that 
the officers' search of the car was therefore made solely to seek evidence of a more serious 
crime. 
11. The State cites the U.S. Supreme Court case of California v. Acevedo. 500 U.S. 
565 (1991) as specifically authorizing the search of a defendant's automobile, based upon an 
arrest made when an officer has probable cause to believe the defendant committed an 
offense. The State also argues that the evidence located in defendant's car was also properly 
obtained during an inventory of the vehicle conducted in accordance with established 
inventory procedures of the Utah County Sheriffs Office. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976); Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); and State v. Earl. 716 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (holding that a search of defendant's automobile trunk was proper 
under the ruling of Carroll). 
12. Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby denies 
defendants' Motion To Suppress Evidence. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel i^Mfiproval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 9th day of January, 1995. 
COUR1 
BOYD L.PAJaC JUDGE '; 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Michael D. Esplin 
Shelden R. Carter 
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